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Abstract
This study analyzes the determinants of both total migration and asylum migration to Germany. For the analysis, a com‐
prehensive empirical model is set up that includes climate change, economic opportunities, such as per capita income
differentials, links to Germany, home country characteristics (population growth, poverty, consumer confidence, unem‐
ployment), the political and institutional situation in the sending countries (measured by internal and external conflict,
ethnic and religious tensions, government stability, law and order, military in politics), and a control for migration oppor‐
tunities to alternative destinations. Panel data techniques (Poisson pseudo‐maximum likelihood) for the estimation of the
parameters of interest are employed using a panel of 115 (134) origin countries for asylummigration (total migration) over
the period of 1996–2017 or 2001–2017, depending on data availability. The analysis reveals that political, socioeconomic,
and economic factors determine both total migration and asylum migration. Economic factors are also determinants of
asylum applications, as asylum seekers most often come for several reasons. Poverty plays a distinct role in total migration
and asylummigration. An alleviation of poverty in origin countries is associated with less overall migration to Germany but
with more asylum migration. Increases in average temperature also impact asylum migration in the expected direction,
thus, increasing forced migration. The most interesting findings are revealed when considering country groupings (main
migration countries, major asylum countries, countries whose asylum applicants enjoy high, intermediate, or low recogni‐
tion rates).
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1. Introduction
In 2015, Germany experienced more immigration flows
from non‐German born populations than any other year
in this century. Since then, the inflow of migrants has
been large but has started to slow. Asylum requests fol‐
lowed the migration with a 1‐year lag peaking in 2016.
The question remains as to what is still to come: Will
there be smaller numbers of new (asylum) migrants, or
will there be greater numbers of new arrivals in Germany
in the medium or long run?
The varied reasons for migration and the difficulty to
distinguish migration in the data makes statements on
the desirability of immigration and a cost‐benefit analy‐
sis of immigration to Germany rather difficult. Therefore,
rather than focus on a cost‐benefit analysis, which above
all is not appropriate for asylum migration, in this arti‐
cle, we seek to investigate the most relevant reasons
for migration and how migration responds to economic,
socioeconomic, political, and climate‐related changes in
the countries of origin. Our analysis will allow us to
ascertain the relative importance of the factors analyzed
and to draw conclusions for several countries of origin
that dominate migration flows to Germany. We analyze
whether individuals from countries with high migration
flows differ in their motivation to come to Germany from
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individuals coming from countries with lower migration
flows. Finally, we investigate the extent to which asy‐
lum migration reacts to improvements in political fac‐
tors such as ethnic tension and internal conflict, improve‐
ments in economic and socioeconomic conditions, and
to variations of the asylum recognition rate.
Our study contributes to the existing literature
by examining the impact and depth of the above‐
mentioned factors that potentially influence total migra‐
tion and asylummigration and by identifying the relative
importance of these factors in relevant sub‐groups of ori‐
gin countries. To gain new and relevant insight, we first
identify the top migrant‐sending countries and the top
home countries of asylum seekers (Section 2). Section 3
lays the ground for the empirical analysis, describing
previous migration studies, data used, the modeling
approach, and estimation techniques. In Section 4, we
analyze the drivers and impediments of migration and
asylum flows in general and for relevant sub‐groups.
We assess the type of factors (economic, socioeconomic,
political, as well as climate‐related factors) that have the
greatest impact on migration and asylummigration, also
for important country groups.We closewith Section 5, in
which we discuss the results and derive a tentative pol‐
icy conclusion.
2. Migration and AsylumMigration
In this section, we analyze the evolution over time and
across origin countries of total migration, which includes
asylum seekers, asylummigration—more precisely, gross
migration and gross asylum migration inflows—and
recognition rates. Themany reasons formigration and/or
asylum are not only at the macro level, which is consid‐
ered in this article, but also at the individual level. Zahra
(2016) speaks of “the great departure” and “mass migra‐
tion” from Eastern Europe that includes migrants who
migrate for not onlywork but also for family reunification.
Migration inflows also capture migrants who relocate for
studying, internships, or professional training, as well as
refugees who travel to Germany to escape persecution,
war, or a difficult humanitarian situation.
2.1. Migration Flows
Total immigration flows to Germany more than doubled
from 574,800 to 1,384,000 in the period 2007–2017
(see Table A1 in the Supplementary File). However,
these inflows which also include late repatriates have
been declining over the last three years, especially com‐
pared to 2015 when total immigration inflows reached
2,0162,000 (Bundesinstitut für Bevölkerungsforschung,
2020; OECD, 2019).
2.2. Asylum Migration
Asylum requests, more specifically, new asylum appli‐
cations, reached their peak in 2016 with 722,364 indi‐
viduals applying for asylum in Germany (see Table A2
in the Supplementary File). In contrast, in 2018, there
were only 161,930 new asylum requests. In that year,
the top five asylum‐seeking countries for new applica‐
tions were Syria (44,165), Iraq (16,330), Iran (10,855),
Nigeria (10,170), and Turkey (10,160). They were fol‐
lowed by, in order of size, Afghanistan, Eritrea, Somalia,
Russia, Georgia, Guinea, Pakistan, Albania, Azerbaijan,
and Moldova.
2.3. Recognition Rates
Since 2008, about 14–18% of annual asylum requests
were approved. However, recognition rates of asylum
seekers, i.e., positive asylum decisions (first instance asy‐
lum decisions) as a percentage of total asylum requests
in a specific year vary by country of origin. Considering
the period 2011–2017, recognition rates for individuals
from major asylum‐seeking countries were low (inter‐
val [3%; 15%]) for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia,
and Macedonia, which we classify as low‐range recogni‐
tion origin‐countries (lrecog). In the intermediate‐range
(interval [10%; 35%]) are Pakistan, Nigeria, Turkey, and
Russia, classified as medium‐range recognition countries
(mrecog) and in the high‐range (interval [40%; 90%]) are
Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Eritrea, and Somalia, classified
as high‐range recognition countries (hrecog). The clas‐
sification is based on figures and assessments of the
Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF) and




This study builds on several case studies on Germany and
on international migration that have examined migra‐
tion flows from developing countries. Among them is the
groundbreaking study by Rotte and Vogler (1998) who
examined migration and asylum migration from devel‐
oping countries to Germany for the period 1981–1995
and 1984–1995 respectively. Using a random effects
model, the estimation results point to the importance
of income differentials between countries, the poten‐
tial existence of a U‐shaped relationship between devel‐
opment and migration, as well as to the importance of
network effects. The political factors entering the model
contradict each other. Deteriorations of the political ter‐
ror scale increase emigration whereas a deterioration of
political rights or civil liberties seem to decrease emi‐
gration. In more recent years, Grote (2018) and Ayoub
(2019) investigated Germany’s response to (asylum)
migration. Müller et al. (2012), as well as Gröschl and
Steinwachs (2017), analyzed migration due to climate
change and natural disasters. The former found it diffi‐
cult to disentangle climate‐related migration from other
motives due to data constraints and methodological
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issues, whereas the latter found little evidence that nat‐
ural hazards affect medium to long‐run international
migration. Other relevant studies that focus on the deter‐
minants of migration and asylum migration and for
other migrant receiving countries are Bertoli et al. (2016,
2020), Hatton (2004, 2009, 2016, 2017, 2020), Hatton
and Moloney (2015), Hoeffler (2013), Kang (2021), and
Winter (2020), among others.
Studies covering several destination countries, such
as Grogger and Hanson (2011), stress the importance
of self‐selection depending on the migrant’s education
and opportunities in the destination countries; Bertoli
and Fernández‐Huertas Moraga (2013a, 2013b) and
Bertoli et al. (2016) point to the sequential nature
and the importance of alternative destinations in the
migration decision. In both their 2013 papers, Bertoli
and Fernández‐Huertas Moraga show that ignoring the
sequential nature ofmigration decisions gives rise tomul‐
tilateral resistance to migration, thus substantially bias‐
ing the estimates.
Concerning the drivers of international migration,
Grogger and Hanson (2011) provide an integrated frame‐
work to examine the fraction of population that emi‐
grates addressing migrant selectivity according to skills
and evaluating the importance of wage differences
in the migration process. Their findings indicate that
destinations with liberal asylum policies attract rela‐
tively low‐skilled immigrants, controlling for other fac‐
tors. However, the authors conclude that the sparse‐
ness of data for which to compare destination country
regimes limits their ability to examine the influence of
policies. Hatton (2016) investigates the determinants of
asylum flows from 48 origin countries to 19 OECD desti‐
nations over the period 1997–2012 and finds that politi‐
cal terror has one of the strongest effects among the fac‐
tors at origin, while lack of civil liberties shows a weaker
effect. However, lack of political rights does not have
the expected effect, and neither does civil war deaths.
Similarly, Kang (2021) investigates the determinants of
asylum seeking, for a sample of seven EU receiving coun‐
tries and 145 origin countries, finding that greater polit‐
ical stability in the origin country significantly reduces
emigration rates.
More recently and parallel to our study, Winter
(2020) investigates the dynamics of the determinants
of immigration to EU member countries over almost
two decades focusing on political and economic factors.
He finds that the latter appear to outweigh the former
in importance. In particular, better economic conditions
can have a two‐sided effect as they can reduce the incen‐
tive to migrate or make migration feasible due to an
eased budget constraint, whereas improvements in polit‐
ical conditions in the origin country decrease migration.
Some of the findings from the previous studies could
benefit from further clarification, calling for a study that
addresses the impact and depth of all factors that poten‐
tially influence migration and asylum migration in more
detail. For instance, the potential U‐shaped relationship
addressed by Rotte and Vogler (1998) and Winter (2020)
between economic development and migration needs
further study and a close look at socioeconomic factors
(in particular, the role of poverty in origin countries).
Moreover, the results concerning the role of political
factors are inconsistent in Rotte and Vogler (1998) for
the case of Germany as a destination country. Thus, we
think that data from the International Country Risk Guide
(ICRG; PRS Group, 2019) to describe the political situa‐
tion in the countries of origin are a better choice (also
see Table A3 in the Supplementary File).
We contribute to the literature by performing an
in‐depth analysis of the role of economic, socioeco‐
nomic and political factors in origin countries. By split‐
ting the socioeconomic factors in their sub‐categories—
poverty, unemployment, and consumer confidence—
and the political factors in their sub‐categories—ethnic
tension and internal conflict—we also gain a nuanced
understanding of the main differences between migra‐
tion and asylum migration.
Finally, we contribute to the existing literature by
taking a close look at the socioeconomic determinants
of migration from specific country groups, such as high
and medium inflow countries and from EU and non‐EU
countries. Moreover, we study the relative importance
of political and socioeconomic aspects of asylum migra‐
tion, and differentiate the analysis by country groups
with high, medium, and low recognition rates and dif‐
ferentiate between major origin countries and countries
with a “no return policy.”
3.2. Data and Variables
We build on OECD (2019, 2020) data to depict migra‐
tion inflows to Germany and the development of asy‐
lum requests in Germany. The data on sending‐country‐
specific migration, asylum, and recognition rates in
Germany are taken from the OECD, which in turn collects
data from different national and international sources.
Unfortunately, the data does not include the education
and skill level of the migrants.
Relevant bilateral migration‐related data have been
collected by country of origin and destination (Germany).
Original migration data for Germany stem from the
local population registers; asylum‐related data come
from the BAMF and the local registers which are usu‐
ally informed by the BAMF and administrative courts
(Verwaltungsgerichte) on asylum requests, pending deci‐
sions, and positive (accepting) and negative (rejecting)
decisions. Asylum seekers are classified according to
their passports, i.e., Afghans who resettle from Iran to
Germany after their situation in Iran has deteriorated are
counted as asylum seekers from Afghanistan.
Migrant stocks prior to arrival, an indicator ofmigrant
networks, have also been obtained from the OECD. Data
on demographics (population, population growth, per
capita income, etc.) were collected from the World
Bank (2020). To control for the relative attractiveness
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of non‐German destinations we construct a bias control
variable. To this end we have used OECD data with infor‐
mation on bilateral migration (asylum flows) to all OECD
countries. Using this larger database, we compute the
flows to non‐German destinations as a share of total
flows (to Germany and non‐German destinations) for
each origin country and year. Data on socioeconomic,
political, and institutional factors in the sending coun‐
tries stem from the ICRG. The ICRG’s computed politi‐
cal risk measures are the only ones accepted by courts
in commercial disputes, transnational firms, institutional
investors, hedge funds, central banks, and multilateral
organizations. In the ICRG data, points are given for each
category, where higher scores mean an improvement of
the situation (see Table A3 in the Supplementary File).
From the ICRG dataset, we utilize the following variables:
socioeconomic conditions (poverty, unemployment, and
consumer confidence) and political factors (ethnic ten‐
sions and internal conflict). Climate‐related data, such as
average, minimum, maximum temperature, and precipi‐
tation data are taken from the World Bank (2020).
3.3. Modeling Approach and Estimation Technique
Since Germany is the host country for all sending coun‐
tries in this study, we mainly focus on the push factors
of emigration. This implies that we model the host coun‐
try, i.e., Germany, rather parsimoniously, including the
relevant (bilateral) migrant networks, the income differ‐
ential between Germany and the sending country, and
year dummies.
Moreover, we emphasize not only the demographic,
economic, and socioeconomic factors in sending coun‐
tries (i.e., population pressure, unemployment, con‐
sumer confidence, poverty), but also investigate political
factors such as government stability, military in politics,
institutional factors such as law and order, and security
aspects such as ethnic tensions, external conflict, inter‐
nal conflict, and religious tensions. Among the political‐
institutional‐security aspects, only ethnic tensions and
internal conflict proved to be robust determinants of
(asylum) migration and hence only the latter eventu‐
ally appear in the regressions. Network effects are con‐
sidered as well (Beine et al., 2011) and climate‐related
aspects such as average temperature or average precipi‐
tation are also included (Backhaus et al., 2015).
We use panel data techniques for the estimation of
the parameters of interest using a panel of amaximumof
134 origin and sending countries over amaximumperiod
of 22 years so that regressions run from 1996 to 2017
(2001–2017) for total migration (asylum inflows), and
from 2000 to 2018 for sending country‐specific asylum
recognition rates. The periods differ due to data avail‐
ability, since asylum inflows are only reported after 2000
and the ICRG data on poverty, unemployment, and con‐
sumer confidence are only available after 2001. We have
an unbalanced panel as we havemissing values. Because
we also have true zeros, we utilize the Poisson pseudo‐
maximum likelihood estimation technique, which also
takes account of heteroscedasticity in the error terms.
Since migration is a complex process, for example,
migration and asylum migration and recognition rates
might be intertwined, we analyze their determinants in
two different models. We investigate two types of bilat‐
eral flows to Germany, looking at two different depen‐
dent variables: (a) migrant inflows and (b) asylum seeker
inflows (both as a function of migrant networks and
demographic, economic, socioeconomic, political, and
climate‐related factors).
We use country fixed effects for sending countries to
control for sending country’s time‐invariant characteris‐
tics, such as geography, being land‐locked, ethnic compo‐
sition or fractionalization, language, colonial history, etc.
As origin country fixed effects allow us to completely con‐
trol for time‐invariant country heterogeneity, they are
preferred to the inclusion of time‐invariant characteris‐
tics given that these are sometimes difficult to quantify
or to observe. Following Bertoli and Fernández‐Huertas
Moraga (2013a, 2013b) and Bertoli et al. (2016), we also
control for bias induced by time‐varying attractiveness of
alternative destinations by including a variable that mea‐
sures the share of alternative (non‐German) migration
flows in total OECD migration flows over time. This vari‐
able reflects not only differences in economic attractive‐
ness but also differences in migration and asylum policy
between destination countries.
To control for potential endogeneity of the indepen‐
dent variables, we lag these variables by one year. These
lags are meant to also capture the reaction‐lags related
to migration decisions as information has to be gathered
and assessed since emigration must be prepared and
these steps take some time. It is important to mention
that using lags onlymitigates endogeneity due to reverse
causality but cannot address endogeneity issues due to
omitted variables.
4. Empirical Model and Findings
4.1. Migration Inflows
We follow the generalmigration literature to develop our
model of migrant inflows. Given that the migration lit‐
erature is extensive, we concentrate on a few key arti‐
cles and their findings. Mayda (2010) uses push and pull
factors in her analysis of bilateral immigration flows into
14 OECD countries using per capita income at the des‐
tination and origin, distance, common language, colony,
years of schooling, capital per worker at destination and
origin, demographics, such as share of young popula‐
tion at origin, and changes in immigration policy at des‐
tination as relevant factors of international migration.
Her econometric analysis shows that changes in immigra‐
tion policy in the destination country are a crucial deter‐
minant of immigration flows. Per capita income in the
destination countries acts as a pull factor, whereas per
capita income at the origin seems irrelevant. The share
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of young population at origin and distance between ori‐
gin and destination also contributes to explaining migra‐
tion flows. The rest of the factors are insignificant. Other
studies (Giulietti et al., 2013; van Meeteren & Pereira,
2018; Villarrubia‐Mendoza, 2016) emphasize the role of
migrant networks in facilitating immigration and finding
housing and a job. De Haas et al. (2019) discuss the push
and pull factors of international migration in their excel‐
lent overview paper also pointing to the role of politi‐
cal rights and political freedom as drivers of emigration.
Based on their econometric analysis, they state that the
impact of political factors is not so clear‐cut saying that
while authoritarianism might increase migration aspira‐
tions, it might decrease migration capabilities. In our
study, we build on these studies to try to establish the
relative strength of the impact of single factors on inter‐
national migration to be better able to shape the policy
response towards immigration.
The dependent variable in our model is the inflow of
migrants migrant_injt from country‐of‐origin j at time t
(Equation 1) respectively:
migrant_injt = exp (𝛼j + 𝛽1 ln(migrant_stockjt−1)
+ 𝛽2 population_pressurejt−1 + 𝛽3 relative_pcincomejt−1
+ 𝛽4 socioecon_factorsjt−1 + 𝛽5 political_factorsjt−1
+ 𝛽6 weather_factorsjt−1) + 𝛽7 bias_controljt−1 + 𝜙t)
× ujt
Migration inflowsmigrant_injt are assumed to react with
a certain time lag to changes in network size, demogra‐
phy, real per capita income, socioeconomic conditions,
such as poverty, unemployment, consumer confidence,
and changes in political factors, such as ethnic tensions
and internal conflict that affect security.
The stock of migrants coming from country j that
have settled so far in the host country,migrant_stockjt−1,
is a proxy for the size of the network (size of popula‐
tion of sending country living in Germany) and the net‐
work effect. A positive effect is expected as an agglom‐
eration of migrants from the same country of origin
makes emigration easier and can decrease migration
costs. Compatriots living in the destination country can
provide information onmigration routes, on housing and
employment possibilities and they can alleviate home‐
sickness by providing a community which shares the
same values and norms. At a more practical level, this
community can also make it possible to keep the same
food habits.
Population pressure population_pressurejt−1 is
measured by the difference in population growth
rate between sending country j and Germany (DEU).
An increase in this difference is expected to drive people
out of their home countries. The higher the population
growth rate in the sending country via‐à‐vis Germany,
the higher is the relative population pressure, i.e., job
opportunities in the sending country and access to ser‐
vices deteriorate due to over‐crowding.
The ratio of per capita income, relative_pcincomejt−1,
in the country of origin with respect to per capita income
in Germany is an indicator of the relative economic per‐
formance in the home country compared to Germany.
An increase in this ratio is therefore expected to reduce
emigration from the home country.
Also, an improvement in socioeconomic conditions,
socioeconjt−1, which goes hand in hand with higher
consumer confidence, lower unemployment, and lower
poverty, could detain individuals from migrating and
hence, a negative sign is expected. Hence, the sub‐
categories of socioeconomic factors provided by ICRG
are poverty, unemployment, and consumer confidence
(see Table A3 in the Supplementary File).
An increase in political risk factors, political_
factorsjt−1, is defined as an improvement in the political,
institutional, and security situation, in the year prior to
emigration. Hence, we expect that an improvement will
lead to a decrease in emigration, and we expect a neg‐
ative coefficient. The sub‐categories that proved robust
are ethnic tensions and internal conflict (see Table A3 in
the Supplementary File).
In terms of climate‐related factors, weather_
factorsjt−1, we look at both an increase in average
temperature and an increase in average precipita‐
tion. We expect that increases in average tempera‐
ture/precipitation will increase the number of climate
refugees. Increases in average temperature will lead to
more droughts, a decline in agricultural production and,
hence, a deterioration of living conditions not only in
rural areas but also in urban areas where rural exodus
causes congestion. In the same vein, increases in average
precipitation will lead to more floods, a decline in agri‐
cultural production, and destruction of living conditions.
An increase in the share of migration to non‐German
destinations reduces migration to Germany and serves
as bias_controlt−1. It takes account of the fact that
migrants can choose among destinations.
Equation 1 is slightly altered (in Table 1, columns 1–4)
to check whether results are robust. In Table 1, column 1,
time‐invariant gravity variables are used instead of ori‐
gin fixed effects. This model performs worst in terms
of explanatory power (pseudo‐R2). Origin country fixed
and year fixed effects (Table 1, column 4) are used in
Equation 1 and the results produced there are compared
to models that include either a time trend (Table 1, col‐
umn 3) or a time dummy (Table 1, column 2) which takes
the value of 1 after 2014.
The coefficients of the variables in logs depict elastic‐
ities and can be interpreted directly, whereas the coeffi‐
cients of unlogged variables are semi‐elasticities. To com‐
pute their impact, we calculate: [exp (𝛽)−1]×100, where
beta is the regression coefficient listed in the tables.
All our explanatory variables are lagged by one period
to reflect reaction lags but also to mitigate endogeneity
issues. The right‐hand side variables can be considered
predetermined variables and their impact can be consid‐
ered as causal since migration at time ‘t’ will hardly have
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Table 1. Determinants of immigration to Germany from 134 countries.
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Immigration to Germany from all countries Immigration Immigration Immigration Immigration
Explanatory variables (all lagged by one period)
Accumulated migration stock (in logs) 0.712*** 0.772*** 0.716*** 0.708***
(Network effect) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Population pressure 0.041*** 0.079*** 0.040*** 0.026***
(0.011) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Relative per capita income −0.018*** −0.017*** −0.018*** −0.016***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ICRG rating poverty −0.154*** −0.106*** −0.167*** −0.142***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
ICRG rating unemployment −0.068*** −0.063*** −0.064*** −0.053***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
ICRG rating consumer confidence −0.056*** −0.042*** −0.062*** −0.044***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
ICRG rating ethnic tensions −0.178*** −0.209*** −0.176*** −0.188***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
ICRG rating internal conflict −0.077*** −0.116*** −0.078*** −0.065***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Average temperature, in Celsius −0.022*** 0.018*** −0.021*** −0.012***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Average precipitation, in mm 0.003*** 0.005*** 0.003*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Contiguity 0.461
(0.780)




Distance in logs (simple distance between most −0.390**
populated cities, km) (0.131)
Share of migration to all other countries −1.114*** −2.809*** −1.107*** −2.645***
(bias control) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.016)
Time trend 0.032***
(0.000)
Dummy for year_after_2014 −0.017***
(0.001)
Observations 1,959 1,968 1,968 1,968
Number of origin countries 133 134 134 134
Origin fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects Yes Time dummies Trend Yes
Pseudo‐R2 (not adjusted for degrees of freedom) 0.854 0.954 0.957 0.958
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1; period 2001–2017; an increase in the socioeconomic (poverty,
unemployment, and consumer confidence) and political variables (ethnic tensions and internal conflict) implies an improvement so
that a negative sign is expected; the sub‐components poverty, unemployment, and consumer confidence are only available from 2001
onwards; all variables are from the perspective of the origin country.
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an impact onmigrant stock, nor on the political, socioeco‐
nomic, economic, and climate‐related factors of the pre‐
vious period.
In Table 1,most of the coefficients carry the expected
sign. To demonstrate the robustness of our results we
show in column 1 a version of the model with year fixed
effects but without origin fixed effects. Instead, gravity
factors, such as contiguity, common language, colonial
relationship, and distance are included. Here, pseudo‐R2
is lowest as expected since other time‐invariant factors
of origin countries are not captured. Column 2 presents
the model with origin fixed effects and a time dummy
after 2014 and column 3 includes origin fixed effects and
a time trend.
We focus on column 4 with origin country and year
fixed effects. Larger migrant networks make immigration
easier and can decrease immigration costs. Hence, they
are associated with an increase in migration inflows to
Germany. A 1% increase in migrant networks increases
emigration by about 0.71%. A higher population pres‐
sure at origin makes the home country relatively less
attractive and Germany an even more promising choice.
We find that an increase in relative population pres‐
sure by 1 percentage point increases immigration by
about 3%. When per capita income in the country of
origin improves in relative terms (e.g., by 1 percentage
point) this improvement in per capita income reduces
immigration by about 2%.
In contrast, the interpretation of the socioeconomic
and political factors is not straightforward because the
point range can vary from factor to factor. The point
range for the ICRG‐factors (socioeconomic conditions,
political risk categories) is listed in Table A3 in the
Supplementary File and is crucial for the computation of
semi‐elasticities.
4.1.1. Impact of Socioeconomic and Political Factors
(Proportional, Less Than, or More Than Proportional)
We choose the wording “proportional” to have a mea‐
sure of the relative strength. We do not imply that a pro‐
portional reaction is a normal reaction and that dispro‐
portionately high/low are abnormal reactions.
Socioeconomic conditions (poverty, unemployment
and consumer confidence) are measured by points rang‐
ing from 0 (lowest/worst level) to 4 (best condition).
One point (unit) corresponds to 20 percentage points.
An improvement of socioeconomic conditions (i.e., less
poverty, less unemployment, and higher consumer con‐
fidence which may indicate better employment opportu‐
nities) in the country of origin reduces migration in a less
than proportional way. For instance, a 1‐unit increase
(which corresponds to an improvement of 20 percentage
points of poverty, unemployment, and consumer confi‐
dence) reduces immigration by 13%, 5%, and 4%, respec‐
tively. The results are computed in the following way:
• Poverty: [exp (−0.142) − 1] = −0.13
• Unemployment: [exp (−0.053) − 1] = −0.052
• Consumer confidence: [exp (−0.044)−1] = −0.043]
As to the role of political factors, a 1‐unit improve‐
ment in ethnic tensions (1 unit corresponds to 14 per‐
centage points) reduces immigration by 17%. A 1‐unit
improvement in internal conflict (1 unit corresponds to
eight percentage points) decreases immigration by 6%.
The results are computed as follows:
• Ethnic tensions: [exp (−0.188 − 1) = −0.171]
• Internal conflict: [exp (−0.065) − 1 = −0.063]
The regression coefficients so far are all statistically sig‐
nificant and robust across columns 1–4.
Increases in average temperature (by 1 degree
Celsius) slightly decrease emigration (columns 1, 3,
and 4) but increase immigration using a time dummy that
is coded as 1 after 2014 (column2). Hence, the result con‐
cerning the role of temperature is not robust. A 1‐unit
change by 1 mm in precipitation increases immigration
by 0.1%.
An increase in the migration share to destinations
different from Germany is associated with less migra‐
tion to Germany, which implies a substitution effect and
could be the result of stricter immigration measures in
Germany. Please note that this variable should be con‐
sidered as bias control since it reflects the attractiveness
of alternative destinations.
4.1.2. Important Findings for Sub‐Groups
Table B1 in the Supplementary File looks deeper into
migration patterns of “high inflow” (hinflow) and “inter‐
mediate inflow” (minflow) countries which comprise
China and India. In the “high inflow” group are coun‐
tries mostly from the South and South‐East European
region, such as Romania, Poland, Bulgaria, Croatia,
Italy, Hungary, Greece, Turkey, Serbia and Montenegro,
and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Individuals from these
countries mainly come to work or for family reuni‐
fication (Sachverständigenrat deutscher Stiftungen für
Integration und Migration, 2010). China and India repre‐
sent “medium inflow” countries. Individuals from these
countries go to Germany to study, to complete intern‐
ships, and to work (Deutscher Bundestag, 2014). In gen‐
eral, the results obtained for all countries are not always
corroborated in our two sub‐samples.
We find high heterogeneity in our sub‐group results.
We observe that the results for non‐EU countries drive
our overall results. Socioeconomic conditions have dif‐
ferent effects in different sub‐groups. Improvements in
poverty, unemployment and consumer confidence by
1 point reduce immigration fromnon‐EU countries by 5%,
15%, and 10% respectively. An improvement in ethnic
tensions reduces immigration flows from all sub‐groups.
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4.2. Asylum Migration
We build our study on previous work, include additional
socioeconomic and political variables, and add a new
aspect, namely the role played by asylum recognition
rates. Davenport et al. (2003) studies asylum migration
identifying the role of civil war, genocide, and political
regimes on worldwide asylum migration. Hatton (2009,
2017) shows that political terror and a lack of civil lib‐
erties are drivers of asylum migration, more than con‐
flict. Proximity and access are also relevant for the vol‐
ume of asylum flows and, to a smaller extent, eco‐
nomic conditions as well (Bertoli et al., 2020; Hatton,
2009). The growth of transit routes and migrant net‐
works lead to an upward trend of asylum applications
from more distant countries of origin (Hatton, 2020).
According to Capps et al. (2019), travel in caravans, exist‐
ing migrant networks, droughts and conflict at home,
and immigration policy of the destination country fuel
increases in asylum inflows from Central America to
the US. Moreover, Missirian and Schlenker (2017) find
that asylum applications respond to temperature fluctu‐
ations. Our dependent variable is the number of asylum
seekers asylum_injt (Equation 2) from country‐of‐origin j
at time t respectively:
asylum_injt = exp (𝛼j + 𝛽 recogniton_ratejt−1
+ 𝜒1 ln (migrant_stockjt−1)
+ 𝜒2 population_pressurejt−1)
+ 𝜒3 relative_pcincomejt−1 + 𝜒4 socioeconjt−1
+ 𝜒5 political_factorsjt−1 + 𝛿 weather_factorsjt−1)
+ 𝛾 bias_controljt−1 + 𝜙t) × 𝜈jt
The inflow of asylum seekers is assumed to react with a
certain time lag to changes in the explanatory variables:
the recognition rates for asylum seekers of the country
of origin in Germany; the stock of compatriots already
living in Germany (network size); population growth in
the country of origin (population pressure), which leads
to fierce competition for resources; changes in socioe‐
conomic factors and political factors relating to security
(internal conflict and ethnic tensions); weather factors;
and the attractiveness of other European asylumdestina‐
tions (bias control). The time lag also reflects the fact that
asylum requests can be filed even months after arrival
in Germany. Moreover, asylum migration of family mem‐
bers does not take place at short notice but takes place
in a more orderly manner, usually after the head of the
household/family has been granted asylum.
Equation 2 is slightly altered (in Table 2, columns 1–4)
to check whether results are robust. In Table 2, col‐
umn 1, time‐invariant gravity variables are included
instead of origin fixed effects. This model performsworst
in terms of explanatory power (pseudo‐R2). Origin coun‐
try and year fixed effects (Table 2, column 4) are used
in Equation 2 and compared to models that include
either a time trend (Table 2, column 2) or a time dummy
(Table 2, column 3), which takes the value of 1 after 2014,
zero otherwise.
The year fixed effects are supposed to absorb
changes over time that concern all origin countries.
Hence, they can reflect changes in the German asylum
policy over the years that are common to all origin coun‐
tries. Iglit and Klotz (2018) illustrate the multiple shades
of German asylum policy. They point out that German
asylum policy since the mid‐1990s until present day
has always included both progressive/liberal and restric‐
tive/conservative elements. On the progressive side, per‐
secution by non‐state agents was recognized as a reason
for asylum and therewere relaxed residence and employ‐
ment restrictions for refugees. In May 2016, the First
Refugee Integration Law offered asylum seekers easier
access to the German labor market. On the restrictive
side, the list of safe countries was extended, including
Serbia, Bosnia andHerzegovina,Macedonia, Kosovo, and
Albania. SinceMarch 2016, Syrians have been required to
apply for asylum individually, as opposed to the earlier
procedure of full protection for this population group.
We also include as a control variable bias_controljt−1,
which is the share of asylum migration that goes to non‐
German European destinations. This variable captures
not only the relative economic attractiveness of other
destinations, but also the role played by asylum policy
in Germany and other destinations over time and takes
account of the fact that Germany is not the only destina‐
tion for asylum seekers.
The asylum recognition rate of the previous period,
recognition_ratejt−1, is also included as an additional
explanatory variable. It is assumed that information
on the chances of getting recognized as an asylee
by German authorities when coming from a specific
home country is shared via social media (Facebook,
WhatsApp, Instagram) and email. We expect that an
increase in recognition rates induces more people to
leave their home country given the political, institutional,
and (socio)economic problems that prevail in the send‐
ing country.
Similarly, as we did for total migration, we start
by interpreting the results in Table 2, column 4, which
shows regression results for amodel with origin and year
fixed effects.
An increase in the recognition rate (by 1 percentage
point) in the previous period increases the number of asy‐
lum requests by about 2%, which can be considered a
minor change.
The network effect is not very substantial either since
an increase in network size by 1% increases asylum
requests by 0.2%. This implies that other motives to seek
asylum are much more relevant.
Population pressure in the country of origin does not
carry the expected positive sign in column 4. Results
in columns 2 and 3 indicate that population pressure
strongly increases the number of asylum seekers in
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Germany. These models are potentially superior to the
model in column 4with year fixed effects as the adjusted
pseudo‐R squared is larger because more degrees of
freedom remain in the regressions. If the population
growth accelerates by 1 percentage point (which is a
huge increase), asylum requests would increase by 55%
(column 2) or 44% (column 3).
An increase in relative per capita income of the coun‐
try of origin with respect to Germany’s per capita income
by 1 percentage point reduces asylum requests by about
13%. This impact is disproportionately high.
As before, the interpretation of the socioeconomic
and political factors is trickier: A 1‐point improvement in
consumer confidence and unemployment in the home
country reduces asylum requests by about 5% and
3% respectively. This impact is disproportionately low
given that both consumer confidence and unemploy‐
ment range from0 to 4 points and 1 point corresponds to
about 20 percentage points. However, a 1‐point improve‐
ment (20 percentage points) in poverty leads to a more
than proportionate increase in asylummigration by 45%.
This phenomenon is known frommicroeconomic studies
in which income is shown to have an inverse U‐shaped
impact on migration. The poorest cannot afford to emi‐
grate, but the middle class can cover travel expenses
and the first weeks abroad and leave the home country.
The richer segments of society migrate less as they are
well respected members of society that can lead a pleas‐
ant life back home.
Interestingly, improvements in poverty have a reverse
effect on asylum migration as they seem to spur emigra‐
tionmaking emigration feasible and affordable. This is dif‐
ferent when we look at general migration (Table 1). Here,
an alleviation of poverty diminishes migration by improv‐
ing the relative per capita incomewith respect to the des‐
tination country. This might signal a U‐shaped relation‐
ship between economic development and migration and
has been discussed by Winter (2020).
In terms of political factors, we find the following
results for the sub‐categories of political risk: ethnic ten‐
sions and internal conflict, which proved to be robust
drivers of asylum migration. A 1‐point improvement in
ethnic tension reduces asylum requests by 11% and a
1‐point improvement in internal conflict reduces asy‐
lum requests by 3%. Given that 1 point corresponds to
about 14/8 percentage points, respectively (ethnic ten‐
sions range from0 to 6 points and internal conflict ranges
from 0 to 12 points), these are less than proportion‐
ate declines.
Both temperature increases and increases in precip‐
itation by 1 unit (1 degree Celsius and 1 mml respec‐
tively), increase asylum requests by 24% and 2% respec‐
tively. We argue that this is due to a deterioration of liv‐
ing conditions.
A further finding is that a higher share of asylum
flows to other European countries reduces asylum flows
to Germany.
In Table B2 in the Supplementary File we present
several robustness checks in columns 2–4. In column 2
we use a different bias control, namely the share of
asylum migration that goes to transit countries (Greece,
Hungary, Spain, and Turkey). In column3wedonot utilize
the recognition rate which is the share of positive asylum
decisions in total decisions (negative and closed) but the
log of positive asylum decisions. In column 4 we substi‐
tute asylum applications by recognized asylum applica‐
tions (positive asylum decisions). As expected, the alter‐
ation of the dependent variable increases the role played
by an improvement of ethnic tensions and internal con‐
flict in granting less asylum and reducing positive asy‐
lum decisions.
4.2.1. Main Findings for Sub‐Groups
To elaborate on what happens within the group of
asylum seekers, we analyze the reaction to changes
and improvements in (a) ethnic tensions and (b) inter‐
nal conflict for two sub‐groups (see Table B3 in the
Supplementary File).
In the group of major asylum‐seeking countries,
abbreviated as “major” (Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Bosnia
and Herzegovina, Serbia, Macedonia, Albania, Georgia,
Russia, Turkey, Somalia, Nigeria, Eritrea, and Pakistan;
see Table B3, column 1, in the Supplementary File)
we find that a 1‐point improvement of ethnic tensions
reduces immigration to Germany by 7%, and a 1‐point
improvement of internal conflict decreases immigration
to Germany by 8%. Asylum seekers of this sub‐group
react only moderately to improvements in ethnic ten‐
sions and about proportionately to improvements in
internal conflict.
Furthermore, we find that a 1‐point improvement of
ethnic tensions reduces immigration to Germany by 10%
and a 1‐point improvement of internal conflict reduces
immigration to Germany by 10% in countries with non‐
return policy, “non‐return.” These include countries such
as India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Lebanon, Algeria, Egypt,
Morocco, Mali, Nigeria, Niger, Ethiopia, Tunisia, Ghana,
Guinea, Guinea‐Bissau, Burkina Faso, and Benin, that
have difficulties in taking back asylum seekers whose
asylum request has been rejected by German authori‐
ties (see Table B3, column 3, in the Supplementary File).
Asylum seekers of this sub‐group seem to react moder‐
ately with respect to improvements of ethnic tensions
and to reactmore stronglywith respect to improvements
of internal conflicts.
4.2.2. The Role of Recognition Rates for Certain
Sub‐Groups
When looking at the determinants of recognition rates
we find that almost all political and institutional factors
are considered relevant by decision‐makers (see Table B4
in the Supplementary File).
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Table 2. Determinants of asylum requests in Germany from 115 nationalities.
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Asylum requests from all countries Asylum Asylum Asylum Asylum
Explanatory variables (all lagged one period)
Recognition rate for asylum requests 0.017*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.017***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Accumulated migration stock (in logs) 0.211*** −0.099*** −0.065*** 0.210***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Population pressure −0.016*** 0.444*** 0.363*** −0.016***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Relative per capita income −0.139*** −0.215*** −0.176*** −0.140***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
ICRG rating consumer confidence −0.050*** −0.210*** −0.199*** −0.050***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
ICRG rating unemployment −0.034*** 0.092*** 0.023*** −0.033***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
ICRG rating poverty 0.375*** 0.175*** 0.316*** 0.374***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
ICRG rating ethnic tensions −0.123*** −0.132*** −0.156*** −0.122***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
ICRG rating internal conflict −0.033*** −0.076*** −0.051*** −0.034***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Average temperature (in Celsius) 0.213*** 0.199*** 0.143*** 0.216***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Average precipitation (in mm) 0.021*** 0.012*** 0.014*** 0.021***








Distance in logs (simple distance between most −0.476
populated cities, in km) (0.607)
Asylum requests to other European countries −3.343*** −3.649*** −0.479*** −3.353***
(bias control) (0.041) (0.016) (0.019) (0.041)
Time trend 0.089***
(0.000)
Dummy for year_after_2014 1.454***
(0.004)
Observations 1,447 1,447 1,447 1,447
Number of origin countries 115 115 115 115
Origin fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Trend Time dummies Yes
Pseudo‐R2 (not adjusted for degrees of freedom) — 0.856 0.882 0.912
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1; period 2001–2017; all variables are lagged by one period; an
increase in the socioeconomic (consumer confidence, unemployment, and poverty) and security variables (ethnic tensions and internal
conflict) implies an improvement so that a negative sign is expected; the sub‐components poverty, unemployment, consumer confi‐
dence are only available from 2001 onwards; all variables are from the perspective of the origin country.
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To study asylummigration for specific country groups
we now differentiate origin countries according to
whether they are characterized as having high hrecog,
medium mrecog, or low percentages lrecog of asylum
approvals (see Table B5 in the Supplementary File).
These countries cover only the most important asylum‐
seeking countries as their dynamics are most interesting
to understand.
In the sub‐sample of hrecog countries (Afghanistan,
Iraq, Syria, Eritrea, Somalia; see Table B5, column 1, in
the Supplementary File) a 1‐point improvement in ethnic
tensions reduces asylum requests by 8%, i.e.:
[(exp (−0.136 + 0.054) − 1) × 100 = −0.08];
a 1‐point improvement in internal conflict reduces asy‐
lum requests by 7%, i.e.:
[(exp (+0.055 − 0.245 − 1) × 100 = −0.07].
This points to a disproportionately small decline in asy‐
lum requests of hrecog countries if political factors
improve and/or a persistence of the poor security situ‐
ation in this country group.
In the sub‐sample of mrecog countries (Pakistan,
Turkey, Russia, Egypt, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea;
see Table B5, column 2, in the Supplementary File) a
1‐point improvement in ethnic tensions reduces asylum
requests by 4%, i.e.:
[(exp (−0.210 + 0.172) − 1) × 100 = −0.04];
a 1‐point improvement in internal conflict increases asy‐
lum requests by 3%, i.e.:
[(exp (−0.057 + 0.085 − 1) × 100 = 0.03].
This implies an inelastic reaction in asylum applica‐
tions of mrecog countries and might be a plausible
response by individuals who consider filing asylum
requests a chance.
In the sub‐sample of lrecog countries (Bosnia‐
Herzegovina, Georgia, Macedonia, Guinea‐Bissau, Niger,
Benin, Mali, India, Morocco; see Table B5, column 3, in
the Supplementary File) a 1‐point improvement in ethnic
tensions reduces asylum requests by 28%, i.e.:
[(exp (−0.093 − 0.233) − 1) × 100 = −0.28];
a 1‐point improvement in internal conflict reduces asy‐
lum requests by 17%, i.e.:
[(exp (−0.037 − 0.145) − 1) × 100 = −0.17].
In this group we find a disproportionately large decrease
in asylum applications, supposedly because the chance
of being recognized as an asylee are low anyway and
become even lower due to lower political risk.
5. Discussion and Conclusions
The purpose of the present research is to analyze how
economic, socioeconomic, political, and climate‐related
factors influence migration (total and asylum‐driven)
from different countries to Germany. The results, which
are condensed in Tables 1 and 2, are discussed below.
We observe, for total migration levels, moderate
migration‐decreasing effects of factors that are related
to weaker migrant networks in Germany, smaller popula‐
tion growth differences between the countries of origin
and Germany, relative economic progress in the coun‐
tries of origin compared to Germany, and an improve‐
ment of socioeconomic factors, such as poverty, unem‐
ployment, and consumer confidence (as defined by the
ICRG), in the sending countries. We also find consistent
migration‐decreasing effects from an improvement of
political factors in the sending countries. This means
that an improvement of the political situation in origin
countries, such as Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Albania,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, or Turkey, could reduce
the number of migrants.
In terms of asylum migration, improvements in eth‐
nic tensions or internal conflict are associated with a
lower number of asylum applications showing that peo‐
ple react to political improvements. These reductions
are very pronounced in countries with a low asylum
recognition rate. People in this country group possi‐
bly file fewer asylum applications as they supposedly
believe that there will be a low likelihood of becom‐
ing recognized as asylees if the security situation in
their home country improves. Improvements in eco‐
nomic and socioeconomic conditions in origin countries,
such as relative improvements in per capita income,
consumer confidence, and a reduction in unemploy‐
ment are associated with a reduction in asylum requests.
However, and perhaps contrary to expectation, allevia‐
tion of poverty seems to propel asylum migration sug‐
gesting that improved economic conditions, together
with the help of families and facilitators, can make emi‐
gration feasible and affordable.
Hence, poverty in origin countries seems to play
a double role in explaining total and asylum migra‐
tion flows. On the one hand, alleviation of poverty
(for instance, in Eastern and South European coun‐
tries) reduces total migration as the income differential
between origin countries and Germany diminishes and
the need to work in Germany becomes less pressing.
On the other hand, alleviation in poverty in compara‐
tively poorer economies (primarily developing countries)
can propel migration by generating the financial means
for departure.
With regards to climate variables, increasing aver‐
age temperatures is mostly negatively correlated with
total migration flows. However, and completely contrary
to the former finding, we see that increasing average
temperatures trigger emigration among asylum seekers.
Interestingly, the majority of asylum seekers comes pre‐
dominantly from countries located in arid and semi‐arid
regions, where increasing average temperatures lead
to drought with concomitant high losses in agriculture.
An aggravating factor is that agriculture and pastoral‐
ism are the dominant income sources in these regions
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and are practiced to a great extent as subsistence agri‐
culture is characterized by low resilience. Hence, the
resulting losses also in food production cannot be com‐
pensated and destroy the means of existence leading
to rural exodus to urban areas. Consequently, migration
to cities can result in over‐crowding and ethnic conflicts
can eventually drive long‐distance migration. Increases
in average precipitation also due to climate change have
a migration‐increasing effect, having a minor impact on
totalmigration and a somewhat higher impact on asylum
migration. However, the precipitation effect is less pro‐
nounced compared to the effect of an increase in aver‐
age temperature. Increasing average precipitation rates
can lead to floods and a loss of livelihood, but theweaker
effect on asylum migration is probably due to the expec‐
tations of recovering one’s home and land after the flood.
Expected aid by authorities or foreign institutions may
also play a role in lowering pressure on asylummigration.
To the extent that the economic crises stemming
from the Covid‐19 pandemic and a deterioration of eco‐
nomic conditions might lead to more political turmoil
and conflicts in the developing world, we should expect
an increase in totalmigration and asylummigration flows
in the coming years.
We leave for further research a specific analysis of
the climate‐related factors and an analysis of other OECD
countries at a similar detailed level, as this could provide
a comparative framework to deeper examine the deter‐
minants of migration in origin countries. Another impor‐
tant aspect to be examined is the role played by German
aid facilitating or deterring migration depending on the
level of development of the sending countries and the
type of aid.
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